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Abstract
This paper investigates determinants of geographic distribution of share
tenancy and analyzes its eﬃciency implications in pre-war Iwate prefec-
ture, Japan. The distribution of share tenancy was attributable to risk
represented by yield variability, which in turn was aﬀected by seasonal
winds called Yamase and topographic features. That risk raised transac-
tion costs of adopting a ﬁxed-rent tenancy associated with the common
custom of rent reduction in Japan that mitigated the problem of risk-
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Given an acute insight provided by the theory of contracts, one of the two
major strands of literature on agrarian farm tenancy contracts has speciﬁcally
addressed risk-sharing and incentives as determinants of contract choice (e.g.,
Stiglitz (1974) and Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987). For a survey of the liter-
ature, see Singh (1989), Otsuka et al. (1992), and Huﬀman and Just (2004).),
while the other strand addresses the transaction costs of enforcement, supervi-
sion, monitoring, and management of input and outputs (e.g., Cheung (1969),
Alston et al. (1984), Eswaran and Kotwal (1985), Shaban (1987), Allen and
Lueck (1995), and Chew (1998).) Even though each of these approaches pro-
vides a clear-cut insight and understanding of tenancy contract choice from one
point of view, each may not be self-suﬃcient to portray a comprehensive picture
of the complex reactions among numerous determinants.
We infer that risk-sharing and transaction costs were both important deter-
minants of substantial regional diﬀerence in the geographic distribution of share
tenancy in pre-war Japan’s Iwate prefecture, where share tenancy was concen-
trated in the northeastern counties.1 Why was there such clustering of share
tenancy in speciﬁc counties?2 Just as the risk-sharing models suggest, share
tenancy was indeed associated with high risk as measured by rice-yield variabil-
ity. However, further investigation into the causes of risk reveals the substantial
inﬂuence of meteorological and topographic features. High yield variability in
the share tenancy region resulted from cool-summer damage, which in turn was
caused by seasonal winds called Yamase blowing from the Paciﬁc Ocean. The
regional diﬀerence in yield variability and contract distribution stems from the
strength of the wind after buﬀering by the highlands before reaching the in-
land counties. Risk matters in this sense, but not only in the way that typical
risk-sharing models suggest.
Risk aﬀected the choice of contract by raising transaction costs of adopting a
ﬁxed-rent contract, given the common custom of rent reduction that associated
ﬁxed-rent tenancy in Japan. The custom required landowners to temporarily
reduce ﬁxed rents in the event of bad crops. Because this reduced risk burden
by the tenant, there was little diﬀerence in terms of risk-sharing between share
tenancy and ﬁxed-rent tenancy, thereby allowing the landowner to adopt the
1Few studies have examined tenancy contracts in East Asia. See Barrett (1984) for the
case of Taiwan and Jeon and Kim (2000) for Korea.
2Young and Burke (2001) study the relation between geographic patterns of tenancy con-
tracts and customs.
1latter system, which compels the tenant to work harder. Nevertheless, the
custom of rent reduction raised costs in negotiating the execution and rate of
reduction. The expected transaction costs were higher the more frequent the
chance of bad crops. Therefore, rent reduction alleviates the trade-oﬀ between
risk-sharing and incentives, but incurs a new trade-oﬀ between eﬃciency and
transaction costs.
In addition to risk and transaction costs, community also played an im-
portant role in the contract choice because villages with strong communal ties
were able to suppress transaction costs of rent reduction through communal
governance of landowner-tenancy relationships. Community also contributed to
enhancing the ability to assess the extent of production shocks within the village
through crop yield sampling, which may mitigate the problem of moral hazard.
This study is intended to investigate determinants of the geographic dis-
tribution of share tenancy in pre-war Iwate prefecture comprehensively with
respect to risk, meteorological and topographic conditions, transaction costs,
communal ties, and industrial structure. We also attempt to test the Marshal-
lian ineﬃciency—the potential low productivity under share tenancy caused
by the ineﬃcient supply of tenant’s eﬀort—because the tenant receives only a
fraction of the marginal product of labor. For our study purpose and character-
istics of the village-level data used herein, our econometric method is somewhat
modest and some empirical results are not robust. We are unable to test the
implications of risk-sharing or transaction costs models for individual contract
choice with sophisticated econometric methods using farm level data as in the
previous empirical studies. We attempt, with this study, to elucidate the forest
rather than the trees and consider the geographic distribution of share tenancy
from a broader point of view at the prefecture level.
Our results showed that, in general, risk was the major determinant of ten-
ancy distribution in pre-war Iwate. Share tenancy was prevalent in high risk
villages, either to mitigate risk from the tenant, or to reduce transaction costs
of rent reduction associated with a ﬁxed-rent contract. On the other hand, en-
gagement in sericulture and employment opportunities in mining had a negative
impact on the adoption of share tenancy, possibly because of its eﬀect in stabi-
lizing income, thereby supporting the prediction of risk-sharing models. We also
found some correlation between the prevalence of share tenancy and low labor
productivity in rice production. However, this ineﬃciency is not clear once we
consider other crops, suggesting a possible moral hazard of shifting intensive
2work eﬀort from rice production in paddies under share tenancy to subsidiary
crops that were not subject to the payment of rent.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The proceeding section
summarizes a framework of tenancy contract choice with some accounts on rent
reduction and its implications for contract choice. Section 3 presents a discussion
of the historical background of a case of Iwate in pre-war Japan with descriptive
data. Section 4 provides quantitative empirical results. Section 5 concludes this
presentation.
2 Conceptual Framework
This section summarizes three key concepts—moral hazard and risk-sharing,
transaction costs, and observability of production shocks—which we consider in
the present study. Some discussions are formalized in the Appendix for clarity.
Detailed descriptions of the case of pre-war Iwate are given in the subsequent
section to allow suﬃcient explanation of rather general concepts.
2.1 Moral hazard and risk-sharing
Existing literature of tenancy contracts armed with the theory of contracts usu-
ally addresses two aspects: incentives and risk-sharing. The landowner (we re-
gard landowners as female and tenants as male for expositional clarity) suﬀering
for a moral hazard or a hidden action problem in which she cannot monitor or
verify the tenant’s action, intends to provide incentives to the tenant by oﬀering
a relatively ﬁxed rent scheme—a scheme in which the rent is less dependent on
actual output: ultimately, a ﬁxed-rent tenancy. However, a ﬁxed-rent contract
imposes too much risk to the tenant because he is obligated to pay the ﬁxed
rent no matter what the actual output might be. As a result, the landowner
must reduce the dependency of compensation on output, typically by oﬀering
a share tenancy or by lowering the level of ﬁxed-rent to satisfy the tenant’s
participation constraint.3 The essential message is that the landowner is facing
the trade-oﬀ between the provision of incentives and eﬃcient risk-sharing.
This theoretical model of risk-sharing proposes two predictions that are sub-
ject to empirical testing. First, because share tenancy cannot fully motivate the
3Theoretically, the landowner can mix these methods by oﬀering a share tenancy with
some ﬁxed transfer. A ﬁxed transfer may be in either direction between the landowner and
the tenant. For example, it can take the form of an additional provision of labor by the tenant,
or provision of fertilizer or meal by the landowner.
3tenant to work, but reduces risk from the tenant, it is predicted to be adopted
in those villages that face high risk and have tenants with greater risk-aversion.
Theoretically, income and assets aﬀect the tenant’s risk aversion if the tenant’s
utility function exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion. Practically, tenants
are thought to be more risk averse if they have lower wealth because it is not so
easy for them to absorb a temporary decline of income.4 In this sense, having
more opportunities of stable employment strengthens the tenant’s tolerance of
risk by improving access to stable income sources.5 The second prediction con-
cerns productivity; it is predicted that there should be a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in
productivity between the two contracts. Because incentives are reduced under a
share tenancy, it is expected that holding other things equal, farms adopting a
share tenancy are less productive than those adopting a ﬁxed-rent tenancy. Nu-
merous empirical studies have been conducted to test these predictions, mostly
using data for developing countries in South and Southeast Asia.6 On the one
hand, results for risk-sharing seem to be mixed.7 On the other hand, for pro-
ductivity prediction, Otsuka et al. (1992) concludes as an empirical proposition
that “signiﬁcant ineﬃciency of share tenancy is not common in areas where
both share and ﬁxed-rent contracts are available options (p.2013)”.
2.2 Rent reduction and risk sharing
To study tenancy contracts in pre-war Japan, one must consider the common
custom of state-contingent rent reduction that accompanied the ﬁxed-rent ten-
ancy.8 In contrast to the majority of Asian countries,9 a predominant form of
paddy tenancy in pre-war period Japan was a ﬁxed-rent tenancy-in-kind, but
the landowners were expected to temporarily reduce the ﬁxed-rent in cases of
crop failure. Therefore, given ﬁxed-rent R, the actual rent r to be paid was
4See Binswanger (1981), Quizon et al. (1984), Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1993), and
Pennings and Garcia (2001) for empirical studies on risk preferences.
5See Schultz (1940) for the experience in the pre-war U.S.—the number of share tenancies
adopted in Iowa increased rapidly after the Great Depression.
6See Chiappori and Salani´ e (2003) for a broad survey on the test of contract theory.
7For example, Allen and Lueck (1999) rejects the risk-sharing implication, whereas Acker-
berg and Botticini (2002) supports it after controlling for endogenous matching.
8See Waswo (1977, ch2) for some description on rent reduction in pre-war Japan and
Arimoto (2005) for its economic implications. See Basu (1992) for a discussion of the relation
between rent reduction, share tenancy, and limited liability.
9Otsuka et al. (1992) reports that the average percentage of share tenancy in tenanted land
for Asian countries exceeds 80%.
4determined according to the following rule:




R if y ≥ ˆ y
R − φ(y) if y < ˆ y
, (1)
where y is output and ˆ y is the cut-oﬀ value of y that was used for the determina-
tion of crop failure. Function φ(·) speciﬁes the reduction rate that was typically
φ(y) = ˆ y − y. The rent was reduced proportionally to the decline of output.
Consequently, ﬁxed-rent tenancy with rent reduction (rent reduction contract
for short) can be considered as a combination of share tenancy for bad years
and a ﬁxed-rent contract for fair or good years.
The rationale of rent reduction can be explained along two lines: limited
liability and risk-sharing. Because the rent, in most cases in Japan, was required
to be paid in kind, there was limited liability. The upper bound of rent cannot
exceed the actual output. Rent reduction can be interpreted as a custom to
meet this ex post restriction. Another rationale is a natural extension of the risk-
sharing model; rent reduction functions as a risk-sharing device by reducing risk
from the tenant in the event of crop failure. In this sense, Arimoto (2005) showed
that accompanying a rent reduction clause to a ﬁxed-rent contract ex ante is
always more beneﬁcial to the landowner than a pure ﬁxed-rent contract (because
it reduces risk from the tenant); it is more eﬃcient than a share contract under
marginally risky crops or regions and for low to moderately risk averse tenants
(because it provides incentives with a ﬁxed rent scheme for fair states). Given
that risk in bad years is mostly insured by the landowner through rent reduction,
risk-sharing becomes less important in the choice between a share tenancy and
a rent reduction contract.
2.3 Rent reduction and transaction costs
Despite its ex ante superiority in terms of incentives and risk-sharing, a rent
reduction contract may not always be beneﬁcial compared to a ﬁxed-rent ten-
ancy because the contract entails potential transaction costs for negotiating the
execution and rate of reduction. This is because the landowner has no incentive
to reduce the rent ex post and the contract was informal. In many cases in
pre-war Iwate, tenancy contracts were hold orally: they were not written down
formally. The process of rent reduction was dominated by moral codes, social
norms, and customs; there were no explicit agreements between the landowner
and the tenant on the deﬁnition of production shock or how to measure it. The
5rate of rent reduction was also indeterminate.10 As a result, the danger of dis-
putes arose with regard to execution and the rate of rent reduction. Indeed, in
some cases, landowners frustrated by such burdensome negotiations revised the
contract to a share tenancy. In sum, a rent reduction contract mitigates the
trade-oﬀ between risk-sharing and incentives by reducing risk from the tenant,
but it suﬀers from a new trade-oﬀ between incentives and transaction costs.
Therefore, transaction costs were a key consideration of the landowner in
determining the contract to oﬀer. What then are the determinants of the level
of transaction costs? At least two existed: risk and community. First because
negotiation of rent reduction takes place only in the case of crop shortfalls, the
expected transaction costs of rent reduction is higher the more frequent the crop
failure. Therefore, high risk increases the expected transaction costs and favors
the adoption of share tenancy. Second, transaction costs were lower in villages
with strong communal ties where community played a positive role in governing
the landowner-tenancy relationships through intervention or by social norms.
We will discuss the role of the community in depth later.
2.4 Observability and measurement of production shocks
Observability and measurement of production shocks also aﬀect contract choice
(discussions in this subsection are formalized in the Appendix). Consider the
production function
y = e + ϵ, (2)
in which y is output, e is the eﬀort exerted by the tenant, and ϵ represents a
random production shock that is distributed normally with mean zero. Most
previous studies have (implicitly) assumed that y is contractable, i.e., observ-
able by the landowner and veriﬁable to the third party. However, an absentee
landowner cannot observe and make the rent contingent on y, so she must of-
fer a ﬁxed-rent or a ﬁxed-wage contract. This is exactly what happened with
absentee landowners in pre-war Iwate. Residency of the landowner is clearly an
important determinant of contract choice.
Now, assume that y is indeed contractable. Were e and ϵ observable? We
regard that the landowners in pre-war Iwate were unable to monitor e directly
11, but were able to measure, to some extent, the level of a production shock
10Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry of Japan (1934).
11The impossibility of observing the tenants’ behavior in our pre-war Japanese context
comes from the fact that there are typically numerous tenants cultivating paddy ﬁelds scat-
tered all over the village.
6ϵ. There are at least two reasons that lead us to this inference. First, although
some landowners had started to migrate into the cities and became absentee
landowners, many of them remained in the same village as the tenants. Second,
some villages conducted crop yield sampling to estimate the average yield over
the village. Moreover, some landowners cultivated their own plot of paddies.
Using this information on average yield within the village or yield obtained by
the landowner herself, she may be able to estimate the tenants’ eﬀorts to some
extent of accuracy if the production functions of respective tenants are similar,
the soil conditions of each paddy are known, and ϵ is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
within the village.12
The observability of ϵ aﬀects contract choice in diﬀerent ways depending on
whether it is quantitative or qualitative. If observability implies a quantitative
improvement in measurement accuracy of ϵ captured by the landowner’s ability
to reduce the variance of ϵ, then better observability implies a more ﬁxed rent
scheme: rent becomes more independent on output (see Appendix for a formal
argument). On the other hand, if observability implies a qualitative ability in
measuring ϵ, i.e., the landowner observes ϵ with perfect accuracy. Thereby, the
mode of contract is completely changed: the ex post compensation will always be
used to pay a ﬁxed-wage. This is true because the assumption that ϵ (and y) is
perfectly observable implies that e is also (implicitly) observable. Therefore, the
landowner can discipline the tenant by preparing an appropriate punishment or
reward depending on e. For example, presume that the landowner can determine





R if ϵ ≥ ˆ ϵ
R + ϵ if ϵ < ˆ ϵ,
, (3)
where ˆ ϵ is the cut-oﬀ value of ϵ in which the landowner decides to grant a rent
reduction. The diﬀerence between this contract and that in (1) is that the
reduction of rent in the latter case can only be dependent on y, which includes
the noise ϵ. As shown in the Appendix, the contract described in (3) will induce
the ﬁrst-best eﬀort13 because the tenant fully enjoys his marginal return from
the exerted eﬀort; he is compensated implicitly but directly on e. Therefore,
12The possibility of ascertaining production uncertainty and estimation of eﬀort has not
received much attention in the literature of tenancy contracts previously except, for example,
Newberry (1975). We thank Keijiro Otsuka for indicating the importance of this point, at
least in the Japanese context.
13An alternative contract that can induce the ﬁrst-best eﬀort under (im)perfect observability
of e is the “dichotomous” contract as in Harris and Raviv (1979).
7there is no rationale in restricting the landowner’s insurance of risk only in
the case of bad crops and she should fully insure ϵ in all states, which results
in a ﬁxed-wage contract.14 The ﬁxed-rent part of a rent reduction contract
under qualitative observability is “irrational” for two reasons: the landowner is
imposing an unnecessary risk upon the tenant and she is abandoning the rent.
It is diﬃcult, therefore, to rationalize the ﬁxed-rent scheme for good years, for
which the sole role is to provide incentives that are not necessary if ϵ is veriﬁable.
Despite this irrationality, the Japanese rent reduction was upward-rigid; state-
contingent adjustment of rent was conducted solely in the event of bad crops
and there was generally no increase of rent in good years. Note however, that
the above results require veriﬁability of ϵ. For quantitative observability, the
landowner needs to verify a signal y′ which is not equivalent to y because the
noise is eliminated in some degree by the landowner’s observation. However,
even if imperfectly observed eﬀort is not veriﬁable, the parties can still achieve
the ﬁrst-best eﬀort by renegotiating the contracts (Hermalin and Katz, 1991).
In sum, a quantitative observability of ϵ and its veriﬁability favors a ﬁxed-
rent tenancy by raising the accuracy of detecting the tenant’s eﬀort. Qualitative
observability of ϵ and its veriﬁability favors a ﬁxed-wage contract by its implicit
observation of e. The irrational result of share tenancy or ﬁxed-rent tenancy
under qualitative observabality depends on its veriﬁability or the opportunity
to renegotiate. The remainder of this paper presents a speciﬁc examination of
the possibility of a quantitatively observable and veriﬁable case.15
3 Historical Background and Data
We study the geographic distribution of share tenancy in pre-war Iwate prefec-
ture in the Tohoku region of northeastern Japan.16 There are two features of
14In fact, some landowners did impose a de facto ﬁxed-wage contract by setting a ﬁxed rent
at an extremely high level that it was almost impossible for the tenant to pay. Under such a
high ﬁxed-rent, by granting an appropriate rent reduction, the landowner can exploit all the
surplus less the ﬁxed subsistence output remaining to the tenant: a ﬁxed wage.
15The qualitative observability case will not be considered because, given the irrational
result, we cannot rationalize the adoption of contracts other than a ﬁxed-wage contract.
Veriﬁcation of ϵ was diﬃcult, as suggested by the fact that a main source of dispute on rent
reduction centered upon the decision of a “standard” yield in the current year, which was
contingent on ϵ. Moreover, renegotiation after the exertion of eﬀort, but before the realization
of output, was not present.
16For studies of Japanese agricultural history written in English, see Dore (1959), Hayami
and Yamada (1991), Kawagoe (1999), and Waswo (1977).
8farm tenancy for this time and location. First, the pre-war period was a time in
Japanese history when farm tenancy was pervasive. Tenanted paddies in Iwate
accounted for 41% of total arable paddy area and more that 62% of farming
households cultivated at least some plot under tenancy in 1929. Second, share
tenancy was concentrated in Iwate. The predominant form of farm tenancy was
a rent reduction contract (ﬁxed-rent tenancy with rent reduction) in Japan at
that time,17, but the former Nambu territory that covered a part of the contem-
porary Aomori and Iwate prefecture was an exception where it was well known
for the popularity of share tenancy.
The main data sources are a report Tokushu Kosaku Kanko: Nago Seido,
Kariwake Kosaku no Jitsujo (Special Tenancy Customs: Current Conditions of
Nago system and Share Tenancy) published in 1932 by the Iwate prefectural
government18 and Iwate-ken Tokei Sho (Annual Statistics of Iwate Prefecture),
1929. All variables used herein for empirical analysis are village level and are
collected from the latter except for the percentage of share tenancy adopted in
tenanted paddy taken from the former.
We partition 13 counties in Iwate prefecture into three regions—share ten-
ancy, mixed, and ﬁxed-rent region—according to the prevalence of share tenancy
to capture topographical and socio-economic characteristics. Table 1 shows the
percentage of share tenancy in tenanted paddies and farms and the degree of
risk measured by coeﬃcients of variation of rice yield at the county level.
Table 1 about here
The share tenancy region consists of Shimohei, Konohe, and Ninohe coun-
ties, where more than 90% of the tenanted paddies were cultivated under share
tenancy; the mixed region consists of Iwate, Kesen, and Kamihei where about
10–60% were under share tenancy; the remaining seven counties form the ﬁxed-
rent region. Figure 1 shows the geographic distribution of share tenancy. Dis-
cussions of risk and topography are provided later in the section.
Figure 1 about here
Based on data collected from Annual Statistics of Iwate Prefecture, we con-
structed a village-level dataset of variables that indicate the status of tenancy,
17We can reasonably assume that share tenancy was not so common because it was indepen-
dently surveyed in a category of “special tenancy customs” through a round of comprehensive
tenancy customs surveys (Kosaku Kanko Chosa) conducted in 1885, 1912, 1921, and 1936
18Published in Iwate Prefecture (1932).
9wealth, industrial structure in terms of employment and output, and topo-
graphical conditions. Summary statistics of the variables are provided in the
Appendix. In the rest of this section, we intend to elucidate the socio-economic
status of respective regions and discuss some ﬁndings using descriptive statis-
tics with particular emphasis on the potential determinants of tenancy contract
distribution.
3.1 Tenancy contract
Despite the popularity of share tenancy in Iwate, it was not observed equally in
the prefecture; rather, it was concentrated in speciﬁc counties, as shown in Fig.
1. The percentage of share tenancy in tenanted land recorded in a report Special
Tenancy Customs dated February 1930 reveals the prevalence of share tenancy
in Iwate at the village level. Among 13 counties in the prefecture, village level
tenancy contract data are available for only some villages of the six counties
in the share tenancy region, mixed region, and Iwate county. Nevertheless, as
indicated in Table 1, a document19 published in 1935 reveals that the percentage
of share tenancy in tenanted land aggregated at the county level was, at most,
5.1% for those seven counties.
It is likely that landowners adopting a share tenancy suﬀered from tenants’
moral hazard. A report composed by the Teikoku Nokai (Imperial Agricultural
Association)20 pointed out that share tenancy reduced the tenant’s incentives
and triggered further moral hazard. The statement is exactly that of the Mar-
shallian ineﬃciency:
“Under share tenancy, output is allocated by ﬁxed rate regardless
of the yield, and even if the tenant exerts more eﬀort and as a re-
sult increases the output, half of the increment will be taken by
the landowner. Therefore, it reduces the tenant’s eﬀort to improve
his output, resulting in dominance of low productivity and low rent
revenue caused by primitive and extensive farming. (p.49, our trans-
lation.)”
This Marshallian ineﬃciency is pointed out in some other studies of share ten-
ancy as ‘the cost of share tenancy’21. Therefore, it should be regarded that
19Cited in Iwate-ken Nochi Kaikaku Shi (History of Land Reform in Iwate Prefecture)
published in Iwate-ken Nochi Kaikaku Shi Hensan Iinkai (Compilation Committee of the
History of Land Reform in Iwate Prefecture) (1954).
20Published in Teikoku Nokai (Imperial Agricultural Association) (1942).
21Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry of Japan (1926, 1934), and Iwate Prefecture (1932)
10moral hazard was widely recognized as a disadvantage of share tenancy.
Despite the drawback in terms of incentives, there were at least two good
reasons for the landowner to adopt a share tenancy: transaction costs and horse
breeding. According to a report Special Tenancy Customs that provides detailed
qualitative information from historical origins of share tenancy to people’s atti-
tude towards it, the main reason for the adoption of share tenancy was unstable
output of crops that increased transaction costs of levying a ﬁxed-rent, as we
have described in section 2.3. The main concern was that, because of the ﬂuc-
tuation of actual output, it was impossible for a tenant to pay a ﬁxed-rent
every year. Therefore, the landowner and the tenant needed to negotiate rent
reduction. Share tenancy was favored by both parties to save the costs of this
negotiation.
Another reason mentioned in the report is that the landowner adopted a
share tenancy to obtain straw for horse breeding: it was common to share out-
put in sheaves under a share tenancy, while under a ﬁxed-rent contract, the
tenant paid with threshed rice. The reasoning is not so convincing because
it is possible for the landowner to ask the tenant to providing straw under a
ﬁxed-rent tenancy as well. One justiﬁcation is that a tenancy arrangement
was made solely for rough rice and not sheaves and the landowner needed a
special arrangement to claim for the delivery of straw in case of ﬁxed-rent ten-
ancy, whereas share tenancy was sometimes called taba-wake meaning “sharing
sheaves”. It is notable that Iwate prefecture was well known for horse breed-
ing: the region enjoyed suitable natural conditions and mountainous topology
(Mori, 2003). The prefectural government promoted horse breeding as a part
of an agronomic improvement policy that encouraged intensive use of horses in
tilling and to meet the rising demands for military horses for wars, such as those
against China (1894–95) and Russia (1904–05).
Overall, it seems that costs of rent reduction caused by unstable output and
linkage with horse breeding were the two major reasons for the adoption of share
tenancy despite the wide recognition of moral hazard.
3.2 Risk and Yamase wind
The indicator of risk we employ is the coeﬃcient of variation of rice yield over
time. We collected 10 years (1923–32) of village level time-series rice-yield
data from Annual Statistics of Iwate Prefecture to calculate it. This variable
represents the risk of rice production, possibly because of bad weather, ﬂood,
11drought, or damage caused by insects and disease. Rice yield variability was
greater for villages in the share tenancy region than for those in mixed or ﬁxed-
rent regions.22 The region average coeﬃcient of variation of intertemporal rice
yield for the villages in share tenancy, mixed, and ﬁxed-rent regions are 0.24,
0.16, and 0.15, respectively.
One cause of this progressive diﬀerence in yield variability is the seasonal
wind called Yamase: a cool moist air current originating in the Okhotsk Sea High
that blasts the Paciﬁc Ocean side of Tohoku region in early summer (Bokura,
1998). The Tohoku district is well known for frequent bad harvests and serious
famines that plagued the district at least three times during the late Tokugawa
period.23 The source of bad harvests and high rice yield variability is cool
summer damage.24 Because Tohoku (literally meaning northeast) region ranges
in the northern part of Japan, its temperature is lower than all other districts
except for Hokkaido, and is likely to suﬀer from cold weather. A remarkable
feature of cool summers in Tohoku region, however, is that there is an abrupt
diﬀerence of damage between the Paciﬁc side of the region and the Sea of Japan
side. A key to understanding this distinction of damage is that the thickness
of Yamase is only 1,000 to 1,500 meters high above the ocean. For that reason,
the wind blowing from the Paciﬁc side is blocked and weakened by the Ohu
Mountains before reaching the Sea of Japan side. In the case of Iwate prefecture,
the wind is blocked by the Kitakami Highland. This ﬂow and blockage causes
distinctively high rice yield variability in the villages of the share tenancy region
along the Paciﬁc Ocean.
3.3 Community
Community also played an important role on the choice of tenancy contracts
through mitigation of transaction costs and measurement of production shocks.
The two roles of communities in the mitigation of transaction costs were com-
munal intervention to private landowner-tenancy relationships and collective
tenancy. It was common for a community to intervene in private landowner-
22See the Table in the Appendix for ﬁgures.
23Iwate is also known for tsunami damage. For example, the highest tsunami ever recorded
in Japan had a height of 38.2 meters. It struck Ayasato village of Kesen county in 1896, killing
more than 22,000 people. In 1960, 61 people were killed in Iwate by a tsunami caused by an
earthquake oﬀ the coast of Chile.
24Yamase not only harms agricultural products on shore – it also causes damage to ﬁsheries.
It is recorded that “ama (woman divers) moan that the sea ‘breaks down’ when Yamase blows.
(Mori, 1982, p.886)”
12tenancy relationships on yield sampling, collection of rents, rice inspection, and
rent reduction. As described previously, villages conducted a village-wide crop
yield sampling called kemi or tsubogari to estimate the average yield over the
village. The sampling provided information to estimate the production shock in
the village, which could have greatly suppressed the transaction cost of setting
the “standard” yield used as a reference for rent reduction. These communal
interventions were likely to have originated from the Murauke system enacted
in the Tokugawa period, a village taxation system by which a village was jointly
responsible for paying taxes. Under this joint-liability on paying taxes, a vil-
lage intervened into various social activities including management of irrigation
systems and community forests, politics, and ceremonial functions. In addition
to this communal intervention, landowners and tenants were both restricted by
social norms such as “not to exploit excessive rents”, “not to withdraw ten-
anted land” for the landowner and “not to be late in payment of rents”, “not
to devastate tenanted land” for the tenant (Sakane, 2002).
It is worth emphasizing that our study period straddles an era of transition
from informal communal governance of tenancy relationships to modern legal-
based governance. After the gradual breakdown of informal communal gover-
nance caused by economic development after the turn of the century, a new
governance system, which might be called a “collective tenancy,” had started to
form, led by the adoption of the Tenancy Conciliation Law in 1924 and raging
tenancy disputes in the 1920s to late 1930s (Shoji, 1991). A collective tenancy
consists of either a collective conclusion of a (formal) tenancy contract within
the community or a governance of tenancy by the village agricultural commit-
tee. Thereafter, rent reduction was institutionalized and made more objective
by requiring attendance of a third party such as the agricultural committee
during its process.
We measure the strength of communal ties using three variables: number
of resident households, fraction of households engaged in agriculture, and the
paddy-ﬁeld ratio. The number of resident households is intended to capture the
idea that collective action is easier to organize in smaller groups (Olson, 1965;
Bardhan, 2000). The fraction of households engaged in agriculture represents
occupational homogeneity and agricultural concentration. It also reﬂects the
idea that communal ties are generally stronger in an agriculture-oriented village
for its nature for need of collective actions over the use and management of
irrigation and commons, and the likeliness of “collective tenancy”, which low-
13ered transaction costs of rent reduction. Finally, the paddy-ﬁeld ratio captures
the idea that paddy farming required more collective actions of farmers than
ﬁeld farming, especially for water administration, which in turn, strengthened
communal ties (Tamaki, 1983).pp.19–20.
Summary statistics reveal no substantial regional diﬀerences in the number
of resident households; each village had approximately 600 households. How-
ever, marked diﬀerences are shown in the values of the other two variables. In
the ﬁxed-rent region, the fraction of households engaged in agriculture was, on
average, 10% higher than in the other two regions. The paddy-ﬁeld ratio also
bespeaks a stark regional diﬀerence: 0.19, 0.51, and 1.47, respectively for share
tenancy, mixed, and ﬁxed-rent regions. These ﬁgures suggest that villages in
the ﬁxed-rent region have stronger communal ties than those in the other two
regions.
3.4 Industrial structure
It is useful to observe the variables of industrial structure to capture the progress
of industrialization and to infer opportunities of oﬀ-farm employment. Industri-
alization might aﬀect both attitudes towards risk and communal ties by provid-
ing secure income sources to the tenant or by weakening communal ties through
reduced beneﬁts of local cooperation.
The Annual Statistics provide village level data of industrial structure both
in terms of employment and output. Especially addressing the composition in
terms of employment and output 25, we recognize three characteristics from
these ﬁgures. First, the major industry in the ﬁxed-rent region was agriculture
in terms of both employment and output. On average, 78% of the labor force
was engaged in agriculture (including livestock and forestry) and produced 85%
of the total output. Second, the weight of the modern sector (industry and
commerce) was not so diﬀerent across regions, occupying around 10–15% of
labor and output. Third, forestry and ﬁsheries have a higher weight in share
tenancy and mixed regions than in ﬁxed-rent regions because of mixed regions’
mountainous topography and coastal location.
Other important sectors that might have aﬀected the tenancy contract choice
were sericulture and silk-reeling. Japan was the largest exporter of raw silk in
25Sectors for employment are agriculture (including livestock and forestry), ﬁshery, mining,
industry, and commerce, whereas sectors for output are agriculture, livestock, forestry, ﬁshery,
mining, and modern sector (industry and commerce).
14the world from 1909; raw silk was the leading export good at that time. The
prefectural government of Iwate encouraged sericulture as a village promotion
policies after the crop failure in 1905 (Nakabayashi, 2003). Encouragement
by the government consisted of production of standardized cocoon suitable for
modern silk-reeling, promotion of double-cropping in spring and summer, and
establishment of cocoon-drying facilities. On average, approximately half of the
households in Iwate engaged in raising silkworms, producing 57.4 yen output per
household, occupying 7.9% of the total output and 13.8% of the agricultural out-
put. However, the momentum of sericulture in terms of cocoon output peaked
in 1932 because of the sharp decline of prices caused by the Great Depression,
which started in 1929.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Estimation of geographic distribution of share tenancy
In this section, we quantitatively investigate the correlation between the geo-
graphic distribution of share tenancy measured by percentage of share tenancy in
tenanted paddies and its potential determinants: risk, wealth, and community.
The main theoretical predictions that we test are summarized as the following.
Table 2 shows the direction of respective determinants to the prevalence of share
tenancy.
P1 (risk) Share tenancy is chosen in villages that face a high risk of yield
variability.
P2a (wealth) Share tenancy is chosen in villages where the tenants have low
wealth (as predicted by the risk-sharing model).
P2b (wealth) Wealth has a neutral eﬀect on contract choice (as predicted by
the transaction cost model).
P3 (community) Share tenancy is chosen in villages where communal ties are
weak.
Table 2 about here
For clarity, we will refer to the negative correlation between wealth and share
tenancy as a “wealth eﬀect” on contract choice. That is, holding more assets or
having access to stable income sources renders the tenant more tolerant to risk
15and allows the landowner to adopt a ﬁxed-rent contract. A negative correlation
between the strength of communal ties and share tenancy is referred to as a
“community eﬀect”. That is, villages with strong communal ties are able to re-
duce transactions and can adopt a rent reduction contract. “Wealth eﬀect” and
“community eﬀect” are considered to aﬀect contract choice only through either
of the risk-sharing or transaction models. Thereby, we can identify whether
risk and transaction mattered. Note however that positive correlation between
risk and share tenancy is predicted by both models. For that reason, even if
we ﬁnd positive and signiﬁcant correlation between risk and prevalence of share
tenancy, it is not easy to identify the path of that causality.
For testing the predictions, we use the following reduced-form speciﬁcation:
si = β0 + β1ri + wiβ2 + ciβ3 + ui, (4)
where si, ri, wi, and ci respectively denote the intensity of share tenancy, risk,
vector of wealth variables, and vector of community variables in village i. For
wealth variables, we included (i) total area of cultivated land (paddy and ﬁeld)
to measure the stock of wealth, (ii) total output from all sectors per household
to measure the ﬂow of wealth, and (iii) the fraction of income from the modern
sector (mining, industry, and commerce) to control for the stability of the income
stream. For community variables, we use (i) the number of resident households,
(ii) the fraction of households engaged in agriculture, and (iii) the paddy-ﬁeld
ratio, for the reasons stated in section 3.3.
Before moving on to the results, two remarks on the dependent variable are
in order. First, the variable is censored, ranging between 0 and 100.26 There-
fore, we employ the Two-Limit Tobit model. Second, our dependent variable is
truncated: we do not have village level data of the dependent variable for all 111
villages in seven counties in the ﬁxed-rent region and 31 villages in ﬁve counties
in the share tenancy and mixed regions. For villages that lack a dependent
variable to handle this issue, we substitute the county average. We exclude the
15 villages in Shiwa county because that county average is not available.
4.2 Results on geographic distribution of share tenancy
The result of the Two-limit Tobit estimates of geographic tenancy contract
distribution are reported in Table 3. A positive coeﬃcient indicates that an
26Out of 95 villages in six counties for which we were able to collect village level data of
dependent variable, 47 are right-censored; every tenanted paddy is cultivated under a share
tenancy. One is left-censored.
16increase in the level of explanatory variables increases the percentage of share
tenancy adopted in tenanted paddies.
Table 3 about here
Estimates for risk are positive and show a high magnitude of statistical sig-
niﬁcance in every speciﬁcation conducted, suggesting that risk was indeed a
major determinant of contract choice. Coeﬃcients of assets (cultivating area
per household) are negative and signiﬁcant for some speciﬁcations. However,
the result is not robust to the inclusion of community variables. We suspect po-
tential multicollinearity between employment in agriculture, which could have
reduced the signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients. Coeﬃcients for income (output per
household) are consistently not signiﬁcant in all speciﬁcations. Compared with
the result for assets, this suggests that the stock of wealth had greater impact
on the risk attitude than the ﬂow of income. We have also included a variable
that represents the stability of the income stream (fraction of output from mod-
ern sector), which is negative and signiﬁcant, after inclusion of all wealth and
community variables in (5). Column (6) uses employment stability instead of
output and the coeﬃcient is still negative and signiﬁcant. Together with results
for income, these results imply the importance of stability rather than the total
value of output within a village.
For community variables, coeﬃcients for occupational homogeneity (fraction
of households engaged in agriculture) and the paddy-ﬁeld ratio are negative and
signiﬁcant. These signs of coeﬃcients imply that villages with potentially strong
communal ties are likely to suppress transaction costs on rent reduction and
reduce the adoption of share tenancy, supporting the presence of a community
eﬀect. Coeﬃcients for the number of resident households are negative but not
signiﬁcant, so the group size had little eﬀect on the control of transaction costs.
Finally, because we have replaced the county average of the dependent vari-
able for samples that lack village level data, column (7) shows Probit estimates
for a dummy dependent variable to investigate the possibility of measurement
error: 1 if the percentage of share tenancy is more than 50% and 0 otherwise.
The wealth variables are now not signiﬁcant but risk and community variables
continue to show signiﬁcance in the right direction. Column (8) shows esti-
mates using only villages with share tenancy data. Some variables, such as
output from the modern sector and employment in agriculture, lost their statis-
tical signiﬁcance after limitation of data. Most eliminated villages are contained
in the ﬁxed-rent region. Therefore, this estimation is vulnerable to sample se-
17lection bias. A concessional interpretation of the estimation using limited sam-
ples would be that we are investigating the cause that alters the prevalence of
share tenancy in a village given that the village adopted share tenancy. Despite
this problem of sample selection bias, the estimate illustrates that risk and the
paddy-ﬁeld ratio are immune to limitation of data.
We can summarize that the mechanisms of both risk-sharing and transac-
tion costs models seem function in determining the geographic distribution of
share tenancy in Iwate. These estimation results support the presence of both
wealth eﬀect and community eﬀect as components of models of risk-sharing and
transaction costs. It is likely that share tenancy was adopted in risky villages
to share risk and in villages with more asset or access to stable income sources.
On the other hand, rent reduction contracts were likely to be adopted in villages
with stronger communal ties, arguably because of low transaction costs.
4.3 Share tenancy and industrialization
Does share tenancy tend to decline with advanced industrialization? If so, devel-
opment of which industrial sector would be prominent in such a change? To in-
vestigate the correlation between contract choice and industrialization, variables
that represent the development of non-agricultural industrial sectors in terms
of employment and output are added: employment composition, output com-
position, and output per household. Variables that capture the intensity of ser-
iculture are also included separately because their impact on household income
is not negligible. We note that the direction of the eﬀects of non-agricultural
industrial sectors is an empirical question. Development of a certain sector may
provide stable income to the tenant and enhance wealth eﬀect. However, there
is no reason to ignore the possibility that such development may weaken com-
munal ties – a negative community eﬀect – because better urban connections
may reduce the beneﬁt of fostering local cooperation. Therefore, it is not easy
to determine which eﬀect prevails in a certain sector a priori, and we do not
attempt to make predictions of the sign of each sector.
Table 4 about here
Results of Two-limit Tobit estimates with additional variables are shown in
Table 4. Columns (2) and (4) use output composition whereas (3) and (5) use
output (yen) per household. We continue to control for wealth and community
ties with the same set of variables as in Table 3. Coeﬃcients of risk and paddy-
18ﬁeld ratio continue to be signiﬁcant and have the appropriate sign, but variables
of wealth and community are not robust to inclusion of additional industrial
variables.
The overall picture suggested from this estimation is that “primary indus-
try villages” with higher weight on non-agricultural primary industries such as
livestock, forestry and ﬁsheries are likely to have more share tenancy, whereas
villages with higher weight on mining or sericulture are likely to have less. Ac-
cording to our conceptual framework, negative coeﬃcients indicate the wealth
eﬀect. Coeﬃcients for employment in mining and sericulture show such a trend,
which is understandable because these sectors are likely to oﬀer relatively reg-
ular and stable employment and income opportunities. On the other hand,
coeﬃcients for output of livestock, forestry, and ﬁsheries are positive and signif-
icant in some speciﬁcations. A positive correlation between output composition
of livestock and share tenancy conﬁrms the connection between horse breeding
and share tenancy. Are others exhibiting the negative community eﬀect imply-
ing a weakening of communal ties? We regard both the community eﬀect and
wealth eﬀects because income generated from these sectors of primary industries
are likely to be unstable.
A square term of output per household from sericulture is included to con-
trol for its potential instability of sales; the raw silk price, and accordingly, the
cocoon price ﬂuctuated greatly.27 Signs of the coeﬃcients for output per house-
hold from sericulture are uniformly positive and mostly signiﬁcant, in contrast
to that for employment, if the square term is not included (not shown). We infer
that this is true because of the riskiness of sericulture. Respective variations of
raw silk and cocoon prices were 0.103 and 0.109 in the 1900s, 0.359 and 0.412
in the 1910s, 0.153 and 0.172 in the 1920s, and 0.277 and 0.342 in the 1930s
(Fujino et al., 1979). Consequently, too much reliance on sericulture exposes
the tenant to risk and would induce a favorable view towards share tenancy to
reduce risk from rice production. Results in Table 4 conﬁrm this inference that
the coeﬃcients were not signiﬁcant following the inclusion of a square term.
27The average raw silk price in Yokohama was 35.467 Yen/kg in 1919, 29.717 in 1924, 21.834
in 1929, 8.950 in 1934, and 22.967 in 1939. The estimated cocoon price was 2.63 Yen/kg in
1919, 2.15 in 1924, 1.67 in 1929, 0.86 in 1934, and 2.24 in 1939.
194.4 Estimation of agricultural productivity
The presence of productive ineﬃciency resulting from share tenancy has been a
salient point of debate in the literature. In this subsection, we attempt to test
the negative correlation between the intensity of share tenancy and agricultural
productivity. Low productivity in share tenancy villages prevails, if at all, be-
cause the supply of tenant’s eﬀort is less than the ﬁrst-best case because the
tenant receives only a fraction of the marginal product of labor after controlling
for production conditions, as Marshallian theory asserts.
To empirically assess this Marshallian ineﬃciency on productivity the eﬀects,
we utilize the following basic formulation:
yi = β0 + ciβ1 + tiβ2 + xiβ3 + ui, (5)
in which yi, ci, ti, and xi respectively represent agricultural productivity, vec-
tors of tenancy contract (percentage of share tenancy), the tenancy rate, and
control variables. We utilize labor productivity as a measure of agricultural pro-
ductivity with respect to the harvest yield of rice measured in koku and overall
output from the agricultural sector measured in yen, i.e., sum of the sales of
all agricultural products. They are normalized by the number of cultivating
workers estimated by multiplying the average household size by the number of
cultivating households. Our primary interest is the sign and signiﬁcance of the
coeﬃcient of the percentage of share tenancy (β1), which the Marshallian the-
ory predicts as negative. The sign of the tenancy rate (β2) is also of interest
because it captures the eﬀect of property rights on eﬃciency through investment
and land improvement.28 We include the tenancy ratio in terms of labor (ratio
of tenant household to cultivating household) and area (ratio of tenanted area
in paddy and ﬁeld) to represent the tenancy rate. The coeﬃcients are expected
to have negative correlation with productivity.
Two caveats must be given. First, we have no data regarding land quality
and current inputs such as fertilizers and pesticides. We attempt to partially
resolve this problem of omitted variables by adding per-household output from
the livestock sector, which produces manure. Second, because we normalize
the output by estimating the number of cultivating workers, the output reﬂects
neither the precise number of workers nor the eﬀective hours of farming. We
include the fraction of full-time farmers to all farmers to mitigate this problem.
If these variables are poor proxies for current inputs, then the estimates could
28Banerjee et al. (2002), and Besley (1995).
20be biased. Therefore, the estimation results in the following subsection should
be viewed critically.
4.5 Results on agricultural productivity
The results of OLS estimates of productivity are presented in Table 5. Columns
(1) to (4) use labor productivity in terms of rice production and columns (5) to
(8) use labor productivity in terms of total agricultural output.
Table 5 about here
Columns (1) and (2) treat contract choice as exogenous. We used the ob-
served data of the percentage of share tenancy. Marshallian ineﬃciency is de-
tected, as shown by negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcients for share tenancy. The
result is robust to the inclusion of risk in (2). To test for potential endogeneity
between contract choice and productivity, (3) and (4) show the estimate of 2SLS
by regressing the percentage of share tenancy in the ﬁrst stage with explanatory
variables used in column (5) in Table 3.29 The result does not change substan-
tially, suggesting that potential endogeneity, if any, may not be great. A similar
exercise was conducted with labor productivity in terms of total agricultural
output in (5) to (8). Contrary to the labor productivity of rice production, co-
eﬃcients for the percentage of share tenancy for total agricultural productivity
are not signiﬁcant, signs are mixed, and the estimate is sensitive to the inclusion
of risk.
For the variables of tenancy rate, coeﬃcients are all signiﬁcant whereas the
sign shows a clear contrast between paddy and ﬁeld: coeﬃcients for paddy
tenancy rates are positive, whereas those for farm tenancy rates are negative.
These signs of coeﬃcients imply that the high tenancy rate of paddy improves
productivity whereas the high tenancy rate of ﬁeld harms it. The diﬀerence
of the signs might be explained partly by the diﬀerent durations of tenancy
relations for paddy and ﬁeld tenancy: paddy tenancy is typically longer, so
tenants have more incentive to invest in their tenanted paddy and to improve
land productivity. Note however, that this does not explain the correlation be-
tween high productivity and a high paddy tenancy rate. One way to account for
this correlations is that competition exists between the tenants to rent paddies,
which raises tenancy rates and productivity because tenants would work hard to
29Even though the independent variable (percentage of share tenancy) in the ﬁrst stage is
censored between 0 and 100, the usual procedure of 2SLS is valid. See Angrist and Krueger
(2001).
21maintain tenancy relations. It is also interesting that positive correlation exists
between cultivating area and productivity, suggesting economies of scale.
As the results show, Marshallian ineﬃciency is reﬂected in rice production,
but not after the inclusion of other agricultural production. This result may
result from a possible shift of intensive work eﬀort from paddy production to
other crops; tenants under share tenancy in paddies tend to shirk on rice pro-
duction and instead work intensively in other crops. Such moral hazard might
occur because tenants were free to grow subsidiary crops after rice production
in paddies; in addition, the ﬁeld is likely to be leased out under a ﬁxed-rent cash
contract than paddy.30 The possibility of the moral hazard is somewhat con-
ﬁrmed in (9) and (10) where the rate of engagement in sericulture is included.
Estimates reveal that engagement in sericulture lowers rice productivity, while
raising total agricultural productivity.
We summarize these results as follows: ineﬃciency in rice production might
be caused by tenancy contracts and tenancy rates. Nevertheless, there is no
sign of ineﬃciency if we examine the overall productivity of agriculture, which
suggests a possible shift of the tenants’ work intensity from paddies under share
tenancy to other crops. As described earlier in the section, the proxies for
current inputs may not be appropriate and the estimates could be biased by
various factors. However, it should be emphasized that comparison of the esti-
mation results between the two dependent variables provides some information
for our analysis because there is no reason to think that current inputs aﬀect
only rice productivity and not total agricultural productivity, or vice versa. In
this regard, the possibility of moral hazard in alternative crops should not be
neglected.
5 Concluding Remarks
Through this study, we intended to contribute to the literature of agrarian
tenancy contracts and landowner-tenancy relationships with new evidence from
pre-war Japan by comprehensively considering the eﬀects of transaction costs
as well as risk and incentives.
Using detailed qualitative descriptions of tenancy relations documented in
various reports, we have argued that both risk and transaction costs are possi-
30This kind of moral hazard was also recognized by feudal lords in Tokugawa period. A
proclamation banned farmers from working intensively in weat production after poorly culti-
vating rice, which was subject to taxation (Fukaya, 1993, p.49).
22bly important determinants of the contract choice. Given the common custom
of rent reduction that accompanied a ﬁxed-rent tenancy, transaction costs on
negotiating the execution and rate of rent reduction were indeed a concern of
landowners. The level of such transaction costs was dependent on the strength
of communal ties that provided informal governance of tenancy relationships.
Therefore, risk, wealth, and communal ties are considered as potential determi-
nants of tenancy contract choice, where risk is predicted to favor share tenancy
by both models, whereas wealth and communal ties have diﬀerent eﬀects on the
choice of contracts depending on the model considered.
Quantitative results of the distribution of share tenancy using village level
data reveal that risk was indeed a major determinant, either because share ten-
ancy mitigates risk from the tenants or because it saves transaction costs of
rent reduction. Access to stable income sources and strong communal ties, on
the other hand, enabled the adoption of rent reduction contracts, possibly by
strengthening the tenants’ tolerance to risk and by suppressing transaction costs.
We also found that share tenancy was adopted in villages with higher weights on
non-agricultural primary industries. Existence of productive ineﬃciency caused
by share tenancy has been a salient point of debate in the literature. Our esti-
mation results do indicate a sign of Marshallian ineﬃciency on rice production,
but not after considering for other crops. However this result could be biased as
a result of the poor proxy of current inputs and should be taken with caution.
We also emphasize the possibility of moral hazard that the tenants allocated
their intensive work eﬀort from paddies under share tenancy to other crops.
It is likely that in rural areas of pre-war Japan, the way of being of the
rural community played an important role in the choice and eﬃciency of ten-
ancy contracts before penetration of the modern legal system. The role of the
community in governance of tenancy relations, however, has not been studied
in detail and is left for future research. It is worth emphasizing that the choice
of tenancy contracts is indeed a result of complex reactions among many deter-
minants. We propose to investigate as deeply and comprehensively as possible
the socio-economic contexts before applying simple theoretical models into the
study of tenancy contracts.
Appendix A Simple Principal-Agent Models
This appendix presents some simple principal-agent models following Holm-
strom and Milgrom (1987) to conﬁrm and formalize the ideas and implications
of some models asserted in section 2.
23A.1 A risk-sharing model31
Output y is produced according to a production function, f(e) = e + ϵ, in
which e represents the eﬀort exerted by the tenant with cost c(e) = ke2/2 and
ϵ ∼ N(0,σ2) is a random production shock. As in standard models of moral
hazard, y is veriﬁable, but not e (we relax this later). We are restricted to
a linear compensation scheme for the tenant: w(y) = αy + β. A ﬁxed-rent
contract is expressed by a combination α = 1, β < 0, whereas a share tenancy
is expressed by 1 > α > 0 (typically α = 1/2) with a “pure” share tenancy of
β = 0. The landowner is risk-neutral and the tenant is risk-averse, whose utility
function exhibits constant absolute risk aversion (CARA):
u(w(y) − c(e)) = −exp{−r(w(y) − c(e))}. (A.1)
The payoﬀ (expected utility) of the landowner is E[y − (αe + β)] = e − αe − β
and the tenant’s certainty equivalent income is αe + β − c(e) − 1
2rα2σ2.32
The landowner’s problem is the following.
max
e,α,β
(1 − α)e − β (A.2)
subject to αe + β −
1
2
rα2σ2 − c(e) ≥ 0 (PC)
e = argmax
e′ αe′ + β −
1
2
rα2σ2 − c(e′) (IC)
Therein, (PC) and (IC) are the tenant’s participation constraint and incentive
compatibility constraint (IC), respectively. Because β does not aﬀect the ten-
ant’s choice on e, the landowner can always choose β∗ to bind (PC): β∗ =
c(e) + 1
2rα2σ2 − αe. Therefore, the reduced problem is:
max
e,α
(1 − α)e − β∗ subject to α − ke = 0,







1 + krσ2, (A.4)
β∗ = c(e∗) +
1
2
r(α∗)2σ2 − α∗e∗, (A.5)






Plainly, the eﬀort falls apart from the ﬁrst-best eﬀort efb = 1/k and α∗ < 1 if
rσ2 > 0. The following proposition summarizes the well-known results.
Proposition 1. If the tenant is risk averse and there is uncertainty in pro-
duction:
(i) There will be ineﬃciency in the level of eﬀort exerted by the tenant.
(ii) The magnitude of ineﬃciency is increasing in the tenant’s risk aversion
and production risk.
(iii) It is optimal for the landowner to oﬀer a share contract.
31Simpliﬁcation of the model in this subsection follows Itoh (2003).
32See, for example, Laﬀont and Martimort (2002, p.383).
24A.2 Measurement of production shocks
This subsection presents investigation of the implication of the landowner’s abil-
ity to measure production shocks.
The extent of production uncertainty, namely σ2 can be reinterpreted as the
landowner’s ability to observe and verify the tenant’s action. We have so far
assumed that the landowner cannot measure the extent of ϵ and simply takes
σ2 as given. However, if the landowner can measure ϵ, then she can use this
information in her contract. Denote the landowner’s ability to measure ϵ or
e by m ∈ [0,m]. Given m, she can base her contract on a veriﬁable signal
y′ = e + ϵ′ where ϵ′ ∼ N(0, ˜ σ2(m)), ˜ σ2(0) = σ2, limm→m ˜ σ2(m) = 0, and
d˜ σ2/dm < 0. Thus, if the landowner has outstanding measurement ability,
then y′ would ultimately be equivalent to e. Under this interpretation of σ2,
equations (A.3) and (A.4) stipulate that the landowner can oﬀer a more ﬁxed
contract and induce higher eﬀort if she has high ability of measurement.
Proposition 2. If the landowner has high ability to measure ϵ, then
(i) She should oﬀer a more ﬁxed contract.
(ii) She can induce higher eﬀort.
Next, we consider the case in which ϵ is veriﬁable under a rent reduction
contract. To keep the contract as simple as possible, assume that the landowner
proposes a rent reduction contract where the tenant’s compensation is
w(y,R,ˆ ϵ;ϵ) =
(
y − R if ϵ ≥ ˆ ϵ
y − (R + ϵ) if ϵ < ˆ ϵ
, (A.7)
where ˆ ϵ is the cut-oﬀ value of ϵ in which the landowner decides to grant a rent
reduction. Under this contract, the tenant earns a ﬁxed share y−(R+ϵ) = e−R





u(y − (R + ϵ))f(ϵ)dϵ +
Z ϵ
ˆ ϵ
u(y − R)f(ϵ)dϵ − c(e)
= F(ˆ ϵ)u(e − R) +
Z ϵ
ˆ ϵ
u(e + ϵ − R)f(ϵ)dϵ − c(e).
It is straightforward to show that this contract induces the ﬁrst-best eﬀort
efb = 1/k by deriving the tenant’s ﬁrst-order condition with respect to e. Note
that his earnings e − R in the rent-reducing state is not a ﬁxed-wage, but it
is dependent on his eﬀort e. For this reason, a rent reduction provides full
incentives.
Proposition 3. A rent reduction contract that compensates the tenant ac-
cording to w(y,R,ˆ ϵ;ϵ) induces the ﬁrst-best eﬀort.
Assuming the exponential CARA form utility function of the tenant and
c(e) = ke2/2, we have e∗ = 1/k. The tenant’s payoﬀ can be rewritten as













































Because the second term is monotonically increasing in ϵ, she should set ˆ ϵ = ϵ.
Thus we have:
Proposition 4. It is never beneﬁcial for the landowner to leave a ﬁxed-rent
scheme in the contract.
Appendix B Summary Statistics
Table 6 about here
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30Figure 1: Tenancy contract distribution, risk, and terrain of Iwate
Table 1: Percentage of share tenancy
Percentage of CV of Samples
share tenancy yield total with tenancy
Region County paddy ﬁeld data
share tenancy
Shimohei 99.8 98.7 0.21 27 17
Konohe 99.4 98.0 0.31 20 18
Ninohe 92.5 94.3 0.22 15 15
mixed
Kamihei 57.7 91.9 0.17 17 16
Kesen 51.9 56.1 0.15 22 16
ﬁxed-rent
Iwate 9.5 10.7 0.19 24 13
Higashiiwai 5.1 13.5 0.15 23 0
Waga 2.9 6.3 0.14 17 0
Isawa 2.2 1.3 0.13 14 0
Hienuki 1.0 1.7 0.14 14 0
Nishiiwai 0.6 2.8 0.16 15 0
Esashi 0.4 19.9 0.14 13 0
Shiwa n.a. 1.0 0.16 15 0
Total 236 95
Table 2: Predicted correlations with the prevalence of share tenancy
risk-sharing transaction
costs
risk (P1) + +
wealth (P2) - 0































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































32Table 4: Estimates of tenancy contract distribution with industrial structure
dependent: percentage of share tenancy in tenanted paddy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
risk
CV of yield 184.896 144.311 164.153 144.679 162.364
(4.74)*** (3.58)*** (3.96)*** (3.61)*** (3.97)***
wealth
cultivation area per 3.989 4.445 4.483 4.469 5.762
household (0.53) (0.59) (0.55) (0.59) (0.71)
output per household 0.005 −0.005 −0.012 −0.003 −0.014
(yen) (0.56) (0.55) (0.49) (0.27) (0.59)
output from modern −42.224 −1.690 −5.040 −11.430 −6.713
sector (1.76)* (0.07) (0.16) (0.44) (0.21)
community
number of residents 0.003 −0.000 −0.001 0.003 0.000
household (0.36) (0.02) (0.08) (0.38) (0.05)
employment in −8.785 −7.545 −12.772 11.984 9.370
agriculture (0.26) (0.31) (0.54) (0.35) (0.27)
paddy-ﬁeld ratio −22.074 −15.956 −18.468 −16.937 −18.764
(6.38)*** (4.29)*** (4.80)*** (4.55)*** (4.91)***
industrialization
(employment)
ﬁshery 44.434 39.472 44.310
(1.05) (0.74) (0.95)
mining −262.411 −218.746 −256.094
(2.64)*** (1.72)* (1.92)*




livestock 182.265 0.123 186.793 0.125
(1.79)* (0.86) (1.84)* (0.88)
forestry 64.260 0.052 61.932 0.056
(2.51)** (1.51) (2.42)** (1.65)
ﬁsheries 76.303 0.053 53.202 0.039
(2.63)*** (1.71)* (1.42) (1.17)
mining −24.277 −0.013 34.583 0.025




employment −39.473 −33.117 −35.771 −36.299 −39.446
(2.45)** (2.08)** (2.22)** (2.29)** (2.47)**
output −0.090 −0.012 −0.044 0.014 −0.003
(0.39) (0.05) (0.19) (0.06) (0.01)
output2 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(1.33) (1.13) (1.16) (1.03) (1.04)
constant 46.591 28.357 48.872 8.729 27.745
(1.41) (1.12) (2.14)** (0.25) (0.81)
observations 212 212 212 212 212
pseudo R2 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.07
log likelihood −871.82 −869.32 −871.76 −867.05 −868.72
Notes: Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses. Columns (2) and (4) uses output
composition while (3) and (5) use output per household. Commerce for employment
composition, agriculture and modern sector for output composition, and agriculture for
output per household are excluded to avoid multi-collinearity.
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
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